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Development interventionsThis paper critically reviews the outcomes of internationally-funded interventions aimed at climate
change adaptation and vulnerability reduction. It highlights how some interventions inadvertently rein-
force, redistribute or create new sources of vulnerability. Four mechanisms drive these maladaptive out-
comes: (i) shallow understanding of the vulnerability context; (ii) inequitable stakeholder participation
in both design and implementation; (iii) a retrofitting of adaptation into existing development agendas;
and (iv) a lack of critical engagement with how ‘adaptation success’ is defined. Emerging literature shows
potential avenues for overcoming the current failure of adaptation interventions to reduce vulnerability:
first, shifting the terms of engagement between adaptation practitioners and the local populations par-
ticipating in adaptation interventions; and second, expanding the understanding of ‘local’ vulnerability
to encompass global contexts and drivers of vulnerability. An important lesson from past adaptation
interventions is that within current adaptation cum development paradigms, inequitable terms of
engagement with ‘vulnerable’ populations are reproduced and the multi-scalar processes driving vulner-
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must be placed at the centre of adaptation objectives. We pose the question of whether scholarship
and practice need to take a post-adaptation turn akin to post-development, by seeking a pluralism of
ideas about adaptation while critically interrogating how these ideas form part of the politics of adapta-
tion and potentially the processes (re)producing vulnerability. We caution that unless the politics of
framing and of scale are explicitly tackled, transformational interventions risk having even more adverse
effects on marginalised populations than current adaptation.
 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1 As examined in section 2: Abbink et al. (2014), Artur and Hilhorst (2012), Barrett
(2014), Beckman (2011), Bergius et al. (2018), Buggy and McNamara (2016), Camargo
and Ojeda (2017), Carr & Owusu-Daaku, 2016, Dodman and Mitlin (2015), Donner and
Webber (2014), Ferdous et al. (2020), Haji and Legesse (2017), Kita (2019), Kothari
(2014), Magnan et al. (2016), Mehta et al. (2019), Mikulewicz (2020a), Milman and
Arsano (2014), Murtinho et al. (2013), Nightingale (2017), Murtinho, Eakin, López-
Carr, & Hayes, 2013, Nelson and Finan (2009), Ojwang et al. (2017), Omukuti (2020a),
Pak-Uthai and Faysse (2018), Paprocki (2018), Tänzler, Maas, & Carius, 2010, Taylor
and Bhasme (2020), Thomas and Warner (2019), Tschakert et al. (2016), Warner and
Kuzdas (2016), West et al. (2018), Yates (2012), Karlsson, Naess, Nightingale &
Thompson (2018). The analysis in sections 3 and 4 drew on further empirical studies1. Introduction: The cause for concern
Inequalities in climate change adaptation have long been on the
radar of international institutions. The 1994 United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, for example, recognised the
inequity underlying climate change causes and effects, subse-
quently enshrining mechanisms of financial support and technol-
ogy transfer to developing countries to enable adaptation.
Notwithstanding such measures, Archbishop Emeritus Desmond
Tutu warned over a decade later of an ‘adaptation apartheid’ in
which those in the developing world who are most exposed to
stark new climatic challenges would not have the resources to
adapt (UNDP, 2007). The broader 2030 agenda and associated Sus-
tainable Development Goals now highlight the need to ’leave no
one behind’, yet studies continue to warn of the risk of unintended
negative consequences stemming from adaptation interventions
for poverty and other goals (Magnan et al., 2016; Work et al.,
2019). A large body of literature now documents how social divi-
sions on the basis of gender, race, age, (dis)ability or class deter-
mine who is vulnerable to climate change and who has greater
ability to adapt (Pearse, 2017; Vincent et al., 2014). As a conse-
quence of entrenched discrimination in society, one person’s adap-
tation may be accomplished at the cost of another’s increased
vulnerability (Taylor, 2015; Thomas et al., 2019). In short, inequal-
ity shapes climate change adaptation and, if it is not accounted for
in adaptation design, implementation or evaluation, interventions
may either be ineffectual or – worse – increase the vulnerability
of those they seek to aid (Ireland and McKinnon, 2013;
Shackleton et al., 2015; Schipper et al., 2020).
Identifying the mechanisms through which negative effects can
unfold in adaptation interventions must inform future adaptation
policy. So far, however, examinations of adaptation interventions
have either focused on a narrow range of technical or economic
objectives or assessed the adaptation approaches or design, rather
than the wider social impacts of interventions on the drivers of
vulnerability (Kuhl et al., 2020). Hence, to date there has been no
independent review of the impacts on social vulnerability of inter-
national or bilateral funded interventions. However, a large num-
ber of theoretical developments and individual empirical case
studies are emerging that provide a basis to identify systemic fea-
tures of the framing, financing, planning, implementation, moni-
toring and evaluation of adaptation interventions.
In addition to this literature, there is also growing interest in
transformative adaptation, which looks beyond a programmatic
approach to adaptation and views it instead as an opportunity ‘to
reconfigure the meaning and trajectory of development’ (Pelling,
2011: 167; Pelling et al., 2015). Transformation is thus distinct
from incremental adaptation in ‘the extent of change, in practice
manifesting either in the maintenance of an incumbent system
or process, or in the creation of a fundamentally new system or
process’ (Park et al., 2012, p. 119). This distinction between ‘incre-
mental’ adaptation and ‘transformative’ adaptation is reminiscent
of the debates between the ‘natural hazards’ school that located
risk in the hazard itself, in contrast to the political economists2
who instead emphasised the underlying sources of vulnerability
located in a wide range of social stressors, as well as the biophys-
ical ones (Bassett and Fogelman, 2013). Transformative adaptation
requires shifting inequitable socio-political relations as well as the
worldviews and paradigms within which they are (re)produced
(O’Brien, 2018; Tschakert, van Oort, St. Clair, & LaMadrid, 2013)
In this paper, we see vulnerability as a fundamentally relational
state. Rather than referring to ‘vulnerable people’, a term that con-
stitutes a common but problematic categorisation of groups such
as women as inherently vulnerable (Arora-Jonsson, 2011), we refer
to ‘marginalised people’ in order to direct attention to the socio-
political relations, such as gender and race relations, that produce
socially differentiated vulnerability (Eriksen et al., 2015).
In surveying the adaptation literature, we review past and cur-
rent interventions to highlight the specific mechanisms that
increase the risk of maladaptive outcomes. This review paper orig-
inated as a request by the Norwegian Minister for Development
Cooperation to document how adaptation policy and programmes
are affecting vulnerability, including both positive and negative
impacts. In response, we gathered a large number of adaptation
and development scholar-practitioners to examine empirical case
studies of adaptation across the developing world. These were
identified through keyword searches and snowballing from refer-
ence lists, encompassing both scholarly and grey literature, begin-
ning with interventions familiar to the authors. In total 34
empirical studies of adaptation interventions were reviewed1.
The cases were selected on the criteria that actual adaptation actions
were implemented through programmes and projects all nominally
labelled ‘adaptation’ in their objectives. The selected interventions
were either funded directly through multilateral organisations or
mechanisms, or through national or local actions supported by bilat-
eral or multilateral aid. The cases were iteratively analysed to distin-
guish impacts of the actions on different groups within a
vulnerability context, on the socio-environmental conditions com-
prising a vulnerability context, and on the processes and inequitable
relations generating socially differentiated vulnerability. Findings
from this analysis were situated in the broader adaptation and crit-
ical development literature, including reviews and conceptual devel-
opment. Evidence of how different ways of planning and
implementation contributed to the impacts of the interventions on
vulnerability was then examined. For the second component, we
complemented our analysis of empirical case studies with a review
of a broader set of past studies that describe the mechanismsas referenced in the text.
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planning, assessment, monitoring, evaluation, knowledge and partic-
ipation processes.
Our examination was carried out acknowledging that
internationally-funded interventions are only a sub-set of adapta-
tion actions. Such actions range from daily decision-making by
individuals, to collective action and formal adaptation policy mak-
ing, and together make up the processes of adaptation to climatic
uncertainty and change by societies (Pelling, 2011; Wang et al.,
2013; Eriksen et al., 2015). Our focus was nonetheless on the pro-
liferation of programmes and projects, taking place as part of
national and local adaptation planning, that collectively frame cli-
mate interventions on the ground.
An independent, critical review of adaptation interventions is
timely as the global stocktake of the Paris Agreement requires
countries to measure progress on climate adaptation. However,
in order for adaptation interventions to contribute to equitable
and sustainable vulnerability reduction, and to measure progress
in this endeavour, the structures around financing, planning,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of interventions that
frame climate intervention processes may need to be redesigned.
In particular, our findings suggest that adaptation knowledge
within interventions, and within the adaptation-development
funding apparatus itself, may need to change towards more reflex-
ive, multi-scalar and inclusive learning and evaluation processes.
The paper is divided into four sections. In section two, we
explore how adaptation interventions have impacted vulnerability
in both intended and unintended ways, illustrating how they can
reinforce, redistribute or create new sources of vulnerability. In
section three we synthesise the literature to identify the primary
reasons that some adaptation interventions have inequitable
impacts. We highlight four features: namely, (i) the failure to com-
prehensively consider the vulnerability context; (ii) the lack of
inclusive and equitable participation in the design and implemen-
tation of interventions; (iii) the retrofitting of adaptation project
goals to match existing development efforts; and (iv) pervading
the three first features, the tendency of interventions to insuffi-
ciently conceptualise what ‘adaptation success’ comprises. Little
attention is paid to how the meaning of such success varies and
is contested between different groups. As a result, dominant devel-
opment discourses implicitly define such success, contributing to a
conserving of the status quo rather than imagining more transfor-
mative measures required in the face of climate change and
inequity. In section four we explore how better linking of adapta-
tion research, policy and programming could help overcome these
challenges by first, shifting the terms of engagement between
adaptation practitioners and the local populations participating
in adaptation interventions; and second, expanding an under-
standing of ‘local’ vulnerability to encompass global contexts and
drivers of vulnerability.
2. Evidence of the effect of adaptation interventions on
vulnerability
Despite assertions in policy, practice and academia of adapta-
tion reducing vulnerability to climate change, we found clear evi-
dence to the contrary. In particular, three features emerge. First,
some interventions reinforce existing vulnerability; second, others
simply redistribute vulnerability; and third, some measures intro-
duce new sources of vulnerability. In this section we elaborate on
these three features. In all cases, it is worth noting that the rein-
forcement, redistribution or creation of new vulnerability tends
to follow the same social cleavages that create differential vulner-
ability and equality in the first place – such as gender, race, age
(dis)ability and class. Consequently it is typically those who are
most marginalised and to whom society accords the least socio-3
political power that end up with compounded vulnerability. The
idea that an adaptation intervention can result in vulnerability is
embodied in the notion of maladaptation (Antwi-Agyei, Dougill,
Stringer, & Codjoe, 2018; Juhola, Glaas, Linnér, & Neset, 2016;
Magnan et al., 2016). While many of the examples described below
can be considered maladaptive, rather than label them as such, we
are seeking to unpack the reason why they are increasing vulnera-
bility rather than reducing it.
2.1. Reinforcing existing vulnerability
Despite aiming to meet the needs of disadvantaged socio-
economic groups and those who are most vulnerable to climatic
shocks and stresses, adaptation interventions are prone to elite
capture, a long-standing problem in development whereby power-
ful people expropriate funds, resulting in interventions that rein-
force existing power relations (Artur & Hilhorst, 2012; Dasgupta
& Beard, 2007; Kita, 2019; Rusca, Schwartz, Hadzovic, & Ahlers,
2015). Our review indicates that goals and priorities for adaptation
interventions are often set in a top-down manner by relatively
privileged groups rather than being framed by the intended bene-
ficiaries, leading to a skewed distribution of benefits in favour of
local elites.
Evidence for elite capture and manipulation exists from around
the world. A process of reliance on privileged insiders for imple-
mentation has been observed in adaptation interventions in Nepal,
India and Tanzania, where the relatively wealthy and influential
community members monopolise benefits and manipulate new
projects for political ends (Yates, 2012; Nightingale, 2017; Taylor
and Bhasme, 2020; Omukuti, 2020a). Sometimes this process is
explicitly political, wherein national-level resources are directed
for the specific purposes of patronage and obtaining political sup-
port within target constituencies, as observed in Brazil and
Mozambique (Nelson and Finan, 2009; Artur and Hilhorst, 2012).
In other instances, people’s vulnerability is used explicitly as an
excuse for not including them in projects. Examining cases around
the world, Thomas and Warner (2019) identify a tendency to
‘weaponise vulnerability’ where vulnerable groups are seen as
potential security threats, legitimising measures aimed at protect-
ing the elite from these marginalised people. In northern Colombia,
an Adaptation Fund project selected beneficiaries for post-disaster
housing from the national registry, yet the most vulnerable were
largely unable to navigate the bureaucratic processes involved to
register, resulting in exacerbation of existing social exclusions
and increased out-migration (Camargo and Ojeda, 2017).
Elite capture may also emerge inadvertently through poor
intervention design. As a precondition for participation, projects
often require investments such as commitments of land, time,
labour or material inputs, which the poorest and disadvantaged
frequently lack (Camargo and Ojeda, 2017; Nagoda and
Nightingale, 2017; Mikulewicz, 2020a). Adaptation measures may
support particular agricultural practices or livelihood changes that
disproportionately benefit those with land, while penalising the
land-poor, as exemplified for the case of Vietnam (Chapman
et al., 2016). Similarly, adaptation measures in São Tomé and Prin-
cipe were found to exacerbate inequitable labour relations, push-
ing small-scale farmers into casual labour for larger landowners
(Mikulewicz, 2020a).
Exclusion of marginalised groups from adaptation interventions
may also take place due to geographical constraints, particularly
when intervention design and participatory processes take place
in locations that are convenient to funding and/or implementing
agencies, agendas and well-connected groups (typically, those liv-
ing near administrative centres and well-maintained roads) yet
distant from the most marginalised communities. Similarly, to
ensure rapid success of interventions, implementing agencies often
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tional capacity exists while remote and marginalised areas remain
excluded (Barrett, 2014; Pak-Uthai and Faysse, 2018). For example,
a study of 27 bilateral and multilateral donors to Malawi found
that proportionately less adaptation finance arrived in the areas
of highest need, with the poorest receiving the least (Barrett,
2014). This occurred despite the stated commitment of multilat-
eral (World Bank, African Development Bank) and bilateral (Nor-
way, Japan, UK) development agencies working in the country to
design interventions targeting the needs of the most vulnerable.
Actual distribution of funding nevertheless reflected donor utility
– such as pre-existing aid activities in the area and ease of access
– and the ability to absorb capital. The latter has sometimes been
an explicit selection criterion for receiving support (Climate
Investment Funds, 2009). While organising interventions through
local intermediaries already known to agency staff can fast-track
implementation of activities, it also risks making the project reliant
on established power relations and processes of elite capture
(Artur and Hilhorst, 2012; West et al., 2018; Taylor and Bhasme,
2020). In addition to potential duplication of efforts, this also opens
opportunities for political manipulation, which was observed in
the case of adaptation to water scarcity in Colombia (Murtinho,
Eakin, López-Carr, & Hayes, 2013). Here, funding was overly dis-
tributed to least-affected regions, while regions with severe water
scarcity received less, in part due to pre-existing development
activities but also due to political connections in the more favoured
regions.
In cases of both deliberate and inadvertent elite capture, a
monopolisation of project resources can lead to a form of ‘accumu-
lation by adaptation’ that widens inequality and undermines
broader adaptation goals. In addition and related to such an ‘accu-
mulation by adaptation’, adaptation interventions can also rein-
force existing inequalities in the distribution of decision-making
authority. For example, Mikulewicz (2020a) shows that in São
Tomé and Príncipe, adaptation interventions are only offered to
those who have land, ignoring the landless. On a broader level,
adaptation policies often fail to alter the social and political
dynamics that have produced vulnerability patterns in the first
place (Pelling et al., 2015; Nagoda and Nightingale, 2017). It has
been demonstrated that even adaptation processes specifically
aiming to foster participation and social inclusion can entrench,
rather than challenge, existing power relations (Buggy and
McNamara, 2016). For example, a study by Karlsson et al. (2018)
of Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA), an approach that seeks to
address mitigation, adaptation, and enhanced food security, illus-
trates that interventions have implications for both asset distribu-
tion and decision-making. CSA may unjustly shift the burden of
responsibility for mitigation to marginalised producers and
resource managers (a problem of distributive equity, or ‘‘who gets
what”). At the same time, CSA often fails to overcome existing
power relations (a problem of procedural equity, or ‘‘who deci-
des”). The political nature of change is seldom acknowledged,
resulting in lost opportunities for enhancing institutions that
underpin the bargaining power of marginalised groups (Karlsson
et al., 2018).
The tendency of interventions to reinforce inequitable socio-
political relations is particularly acute in the context of conflict.
Some adaptation efforts take place in violent settings, where con-
flict is a major cause of vulnerability to climate change, and vio-
lence and insecurity may stall or delay implementation of
interventions (Peters et al., 2019). However, climate change inter-
ventions seldom tackle inequitable power relations head-on, and
often assume that adaptation takes place in peaceful, non-
conflictual settings. As a result, adaptation measures are often seen
as purely technical interventions and implemented without prop-
erly considering conflict dynamics or political contexts (Tänzler,4
Maas, & Carius, 2010; Levine et al., 2014). Climate change and con-
flict resolution/peacebuilding efforts also have traditionally oper-
ated as two entirely separate sectors with very limited
engagement between them (Matthew, 2014). This means that syn-
ergies are largely ignored, although there are some recent attempts
to bring them together within the field of environmental peace-
building (Schilling et al., 2017; Ide, 2020).
Furthermore, there are increasing concerns that climate change
interventions may not only reinforce inequitable power relations,
but also serve to exacerbate existing political tensions or conflict
dynamics – especially in situations where interventions reinforce
particular livelihood activities, alter power relations and institu-
tions of environmental governance, or shift patterns of authority
over natural resources that are already highly contested (Corbera
et al., 2017; Nightingale, 2017). As highlighted by a growing num-
ber of scholars, such as Abrahams & Carr, 2017; Tänzler, Maas, &
Carius, 2010, and Work (2019), conflicts may not necessarily
emerge as a direct result of climate change, but instead as a conse-
quence of climate change interventions implemented ‘in the name
of climate change’. These dynamics are illustrated by the case of
Gambella, Ethiopia, where Milman and Arsano (2014) found that
climate change adaptation efforts served to increase rather than
decrease tensions in the region, due to their differentiated impacts
on human security. The Villagisation Programme targeting pas-
toralists and the Ethiopian Agricultural Development Led Industri-
alisation (ADLI) strategies were intended to reduce vulnerability.
However, by creating areas that were off-limits to local popula-
tions, these strategies effectively reduced these people’s access to
land and resources traditionally relied upon during periods of
stress like floods and droughts, thereby increasing vulnerability
for some groups and exacerbating socio-political tensions in the
region (Milman and Arsano, 2014). Of particular concern is how
interventions operating in (semi-)authoritarian contexts may end
up avoiding topics considered too sensitive for the government –
but which are root causes of vulnerability – such as widespread
discrimination of minority ethnic- and religious groups, intra-
state conflict and violence, or violations of human rights. This
has been a particular concern within the humanitarian arena (del
Valle and Healy, 2013; Décobert, 2020) extending Dodman and
Mitlin’s (2015) observation that local and national political con-
texts matter greatly for the effectiveness of development interven-
tions, and in particular their ability to reach the most vulnerable
groups of people.
There is thus an expanding literature that shows that the cli-
mate change adaptation process itself – as any societal change –
takes place through convergence and tensions between different
interests, as well as contestations over who has the authority to
make decisions (Taylor, 2015; Tschakert et al., 2016). Adaptation
takes place through socio-political and environmental disruptions
and turbulence; indeed, adaptation itself may need to be disruptive
or transformative in order to overcome a status quo that produces
vulnerability (Wilson, 2014). Power here is conceptualised as fun-
damentally relational with the focus on its exercise through
authority, knowledges and subjectivities (Eriksen et al., 2015;
Ahlborg and Nightingale, 2018). Social actors exercise power as
they attempt to shape the institutional and discursive contexts
through which programmes are designed, enacted, legitimatised
and contested (Nightingale, 2017). At the same time, such efforts
to shape adaptation processes always contain an element of uncer-
tainty and resistance. Successfully influencing how planning pro-
ceeds, including shaping the official and informal aims of
projects, the ways in which funds and contracts are distributed,
the forums and mechanisms for participation and decision making,
and the discursive parameters that shape the identities assumed
by subjects within adaptation practices bolsters authority. In con-
trast, the inability to assert authority over such parameters rein-
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marginalise those without influence (Mosse, 2010; Taylor, 2015).
The exercise of power is therefore inherently relational: it is simul-
taneously enabling or facilitating for some and constraining or dis-
abling for others in ways that strongly influence the distribution of
authority, resources and risks across adaptation projects.
Climate change policies and interventions are therefore nested
in existing power relations and political contestations. At the core
of these contestations, we find struggles connected to identity and
belonging (Nightingale, 2017). Questions such as ‘who are the
rightful owners of this environment and resources?’ and ‘who
should make decisions about how we use this environment in
the face of climate change?’ are essentially political questions that
cannot be addressed only through technocratic climate change
interventions. In bypassing such discussions and effectively
depoliticising climate change efforts, development actors may
reproduce rather than challenge the political and social status
quo, and unintentionally contribute to further marginalise the
interests and needs of the least powerful people. They may also
serve to ultimately entrench systems and behaviours that are
unsustainable in the face of climate change, particularly where
adaptation actions are manipulated to support existing priorities
and interests (Atteridge & Remling, 2018; Levine et al., 2014).
2.2. Measures that redistribute vulnerability
Alongside reinforcing existing inequalities and vulnerability,
there is a risk with some interventions that there may be offsite
effects that lead to a redistribution of vulnerability over a broader
spatial area or among other groups (Atteridge & Remling, 2018;
Thomas & Warner, 2019).
Interventions related to water and coastal areas are common
examples of spatially shifting vulnerability and risk and failing to
recognise how infrastructural and technical interventions reshape
power relations. In Vietnam, hydroelectric dam and forest protec-
tion policies may contribute to regulating floods in lowlands and
thus at first appear beneficial for reducing vulnerability to specific
hazards there (Beckman, 2011). However, at the same time, these
policies undermine access to land and forest resources for moun-
tain peoples (who are already socio-politically marginalised),
which directly interferes with their abilities to exercise power in
relation to who controls their resources and what knowledges
and practices they use to govern them, reducing their adaptive
capacity. Other examples include how flood embankments protect-
ing one community can increase the vulnerability of downstream
communities, and how coastal infrastructure designed to reduce
risk can negatively affect neighbouring coastal areas or the local
ecology (Donner and Webber, 2014; Ferdous et al., 2020). Also in
Vietnam, the Ecopark housing development in Hanoi is described
as a sustainable living environment, yet it required the eviction
of 4000 families who had previously been living on the land
(Thomas and Warner, 2019). Similar processes can occur at any
scale (cases reviewed in Atteridge & Remling, 2018). Adaptation
in one area may also alter regional or global market conditions.
For example, increased use of expensive and sophisticated agro-
technologies as a response to drought by politically and economi-
cally advantaged social actors introduces new risks through divert-
ing resources away from agrarian development programmes
intended to target the rural poor (Warner and Kuzdas, 2016).
2.3. Introducing new risks and sources of vulnerability
In addition to the danger of interventions reinforcing or redis-
tributing existing inequalities and vulnerability, empirical studies
of adaptation interventions suggest that some adaptation efforts
introduce new risks and sources of vulnerability. For example,5
the IPCC Special Report on the impacts of 1.5 C warming identified
several ways in which adaptation efforts can increase economic,
social and environmental costs, or undermine existing local adap-
tation strategies: increased (unregulated) fertiliser and pesticide
use can create risks to both human health and ecological systems;
increased irrigation in agriculture may reduce water availability for
domestic and other purposes; and some adaptation measures
increase workloads, economic costs or debt to farmers (IPCC,
2018).
A first type of risk that can be introduced by adaptation efforts
results from implementing measures that address short term con-
cerns but inadvertently introduce longer-term risks. A particular
form of risk arises when a moral hazard known as a ‘safe develop-
ment paradox’ is promoted, such as building dykes to protect from
flooding (Burby, 2006). These efforts can create a false sense of
security in a location that encourages high-risk activities. Evidence
of this is found in many places, including in Bangladesh, where a
large project that focused on upgrading coastal infrastructure to
protect it from tropical cyclones, storm surges, floods and sea-
level rise, served to encourage people to remain in these high-
risk areas, thus resulting in maladaptation (Magnan et al., 2016).
This case illustrates what can happen when decision making
focuses on the trade-off between avoiding near-term disruption
and reducing future risk, in which the preference is for incremental
adaptation that protects and preserves existing systems and beha-
viours, over transformative adaptation that will disrupt them or
require their abandonment or displacement. Policymakers often
see incremental adaptation and its infrastructural fixes as the only
option. This failure to imagine more transformative adaptation
options by thinking more holistically about the overall problem
may introduce new risks in the long term.
In addition, initiatives that do not consider long-term projected
climate impacts may be unsustainable or produce negative path
dependencies in the long term. ‘Reactive’ adaptation initiatives –
which might also be described as ‘coping’ – are commonplace.
These are responses to existing and well-known recurrent impacts
over the short term such as infrastructure to combat flooding or
efforts to increase agricultural productivity in areas that see
increasing drought, observed both at household and policy level
(Ojwang et al., 2017; Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018). While addressing
vulnerability to current climate variability and impacts is impor-
tant, it is rarely enough to adapt to future climate change (Dilling
et al., 2015; Mikulewicz and Taylor, 2020). A review of 31 adapta-
tion case studies across the world found evidence of temporal ‘re-
bound’ effects: for example, hard seawall infrastructure that
decreases flexibility of future options; redirecting traditional liveli-
hoods to (over)specialized options that may only be effective in the
short run; and irrigation and water management interventions
with negative impacts on the environment as well as on longer
term adaptive capacity (Juhola, Glaas, Linnér, & Neset, 2016). These
temporal reboud effects constitute a risk given uncertainty regard-
ing the future manifestations and impacts of climate change (Levin
et al., 2012; IPCC, 2018), combined with the preference for techni-
cal adaptation solutions, for example infrastructure, which have
long lifespans and cause lock-in (UNEP, 2017). Managing uncer-
tainties through more flexible, inclusive, and locally appropriate
technologies, knowledge and assessments is thus key towards
achieving more transformative adaptation pathways (Mehta
et al., 2019).
Second, several studies have documented cases of climate ini-
tiatives undermining local adaptation strategies through (often
unintended) negative consequences on resource access and land
rights critical to local populations’ livelihoods and environmental
governance systems. In a case study of municipal funding of adap-
tation to water scarcity by 111 rural water associations in Colom-
bia, top-down interventions (i.e. fund distribution decisions taken
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telism and control and were less effective than locally-driven ini-
tiatives by community water organisations, which were ‘crowded
out’ by external interventions (Murtinho, Eakin, López-Carr, &
Hayes, 2013).
The most extreme cases of top-down interventions introducing
vulnerability come from (re)settlement policies. Pastoralists in the
peripheral lowlands of Ethiopia have recently been forced to settle
as part of the country’s Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy.
While the resettlement aims to build climate resilience, current
and past settlement programmes in Ethiopia’s peripheral lowlands
have led to further marginalisation, decreased food security, and
exacerbated vulnerability for pastoralists (Abbink et al., 2014;
Haji and Legesse, 2017). In the lower Zambezi valley of Mozam-
bique, international climate adaptation finance has played an inad-
vertent role in supporting the government’s controversial
relocation policies. These relocations, focusing on some of the most
politically and economically marginalised groups in Mozambique,
have been accomplished through persuasion, threat of military
force or arrest, and the withdrawal of basic services (e.g. schools
and clinics) from villages that refuse to relocate. While donors
and donor-funded NGOs may not explicitly support or participate
in relocations, the promotion by such actors of increased focus
on climate change hazards can provide governments with spurious
justifications for policies involving relocation and coercive liveli-
hood transformations (Arnall, 2014; Artur and Hilhorst, 2012;
Kothari, 2014).
As these cases emphasise, adaptation measures imposed from
above often lead to disruptive changes – with short-sighted goals
– that cannot easily be reversed. This lock-in effect, whereby com-
munities become wedded to potentially negative pathways of
change, has been observed in diverse contexts (Wilson, 2014).
Bergius et al. (2018) describe how ‘green economy’-oriented
public-private partnerships in Tanzania supported by the Norwe-
gian Fund for International Development (Norfund), including
investments in agriculture, conservation, and climate measures,
entailed the forced replacement of small-scale farming and livestock
herding with wetland conservation and commercial farming. This
transformation of land use and production systems has increased
the vulnerability of many households, in addition to undermining
the economic sustainability of agricultural production. In Bangla-
desh, Paprocki (2018) found that local elites and donors used pro-
jects supported by adaptation finance to move vulnerable
populations out of agrarian livelihoods and into urban livelihoods,
such as factory labour, further marginalising agrarian communities
and promoting the developmental priorities of elites. Together,
these examples of top-down interventions or efforts to enforce
livelihood transformations raise the concern that adaptation inter-
ventions can become a means of increasing government and elite
control over marginalised people’s livelihoods, natural resource
management, and autonomous adaptation strategies, further dis-
empowering them and creating new sources of vulnerability.
3. Mechanisms undermining equitable vulnerability reduction
As our examination of past adaptation case studies and reviews
has revealed, interventions—despite good intentions and positive
effects on some groups—can contribute to reinforcing, redistribut-
ing or creating new sources of vulnerability. In this section, we
draw on the empirical cases examined above, as well as a growing
body of literature on adaptation processes and the practical expe-
rience of the authors, in order to identify the mechanisms through
which such unintended consequences occur. Four such key mech-
anisms emerge from this analysis: (i) insufficient understanding of
contextual vulnerability by interventions planners and imple-
menters, including socio-political relations of gender, race, age6
(dis)ability and class; (ii) inequitable participation by vulnerable
and affected groups in planning and implementation, leading to
top-down processes and poor representation of marginalised
groups’ perspectives; (iii) retrofitting adaptation into existing
development ideas, projects, and forms of assistance; and (iv)
insufficient engagement with what ‘adaptation success’ consti-
tutes, dominant development discourses implicitly defining such
success.
3.1. Insufficient understanding of contextual vulnerability
Reducing the vulnerability of the most marginalised requires a
deep understanding of the history of past and current socio-
politics of vulnerability and adaptation processes, including how
the resilience and incomes of some groups is related to the vulner-
ability of others through resource access, distribution and power
relations (Taylor, 2015). Alas, these uneven socio-political eco-
nomic relations are often overlooked (Bassett and Fogelman,
2013), with most studies focusing on adjusting to impacts. Vulner-
ability reduction also requires attention to the exercise of power in
relation to knowledge across scales. Interventions need to support
shifting actions and learning processes as new knowledge arises
and as adaptation and vulnerability patterns unfold. Yet, vulnera-
bility assessments carried out as part of project development are
often structured by predetermined indicators and approaches
developed elsewhere, reflecting the exercise of power within the
entire process. Thus, they do not adequately capture the social
and environmental processes that produce specific distributions
of vulnerability in a given place, such as the socio-political rela-
tions and processes through which particular groups are margina-
lised, including gender, race, age (dis)ability and class (Tschakert
et al., 2013; Nyborg and Nawab, 2017). In particular, vulnerability
assessments are often gender-blind, and thus run a high risk of vul-
nerability being redistributed or unequally exacerbated (Morchain
et al., 2015), as outlined in Section 2. Despite the prevalence of gen-
der strategies in various funding streams such as the Green Climate
Fund, the Adaptation Fund, and Global Environment Facility mech-
anisms, for example, gender sensitivity often takes the form of dis-
aggregating data by gender, but not actually designing
interventions to account for how gender shapes the exercise of
power (Persson & Remling, 2014). A recent review of the Adapta-
tion Fund also showed that less than half of surveyed Implement-
ing Entities, board members, Designated Authorities and NGOs
thought that policies and programmes sufficiently take into
account gender considerations (Adaptation Fund, 2019).
A further, underlying reason for the failure to understand and
monitor the evolution of vulnerability is insufficient knowledge
and capacity at the various levels of project implementation. Adap-
tation is still a relatively new field and its context- and scale-
specificity makes it difficult for governments and NGOs to have
sufficient dedicated expertise (Ojwang et al., 2017). Inadequate
understanding and an ignoring of the local vulnerability context
and drivers of vulnerability often pervade governmental, non-
governmental and development organisations tasked with funding,
planning and implementing adaptation interventions. This gap is,
in turn, both reflected in and reinforced by the projectisation of
adaptation initiatives, both by bilateral and multilateral donors
and through international adaptation finance (Mikulewicz,
2020b; Mikulewicz and Taylor, 2020). Outsourcing of different
components of project design, implementation and evaluation –
all taking place on different timeframes and with limited alloca-
tions – impedes optimal learning and rarely involves local and
international research expertise. The short time frames and the
(perceived) limited expertise within developing countries means
adaptation planning is often done as short-term consultancies,
with a high reliance on external experts and insufficient local
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also increase the reliance on external experts who know how to
negotiate the application process, but who may not have a deep
knowledge about the vulnerability context.
There is often little opportunity for critical analysis of how an
intervention may affect (or has affected) vulnerability, nor to inte-
grate lessons from past development successes and failures
(Horstmann, 2011; Remling and Persson, 2015). The competitive
project-based nature of funding exacerbates this problem: con-
ducting a comprehensive vulnerability assessment can be
resource-intensive, but is typically not budgeted, and incentives
to share information between organisations are almost nonexis-
tent. A political commitment to fund particular technical and
infrastructural interventions (such as climate services or reforesta-
tion) persists in the absence of compelling evidence for the positive
impacts of these interventions on vulnerability reduction, sustain-
ability, and institutionalisation. Climate change adaptation inter-
ventions would benefit from compiling and integrating the
lessons learned of previous projects, to enable improvement
(West et al., 2018).
The subsequent monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks
through which adaptation interventions are assessed are often
similarly ill equipped to assess whether or not vulnerability is
reinforced or redistributed by adaptation interventions. Rather
than interrogating the underlying drivers of vulnerability and
the longer-term qualitative dimensions of building resilience,
assessments and monitoring frameworks are often focused on
outputs (goods and services delivered; number of people tar-
geted) and value for money (Kaika, 2017). While the language
around adaptation interventions increasingly emphasises moni-
toring, evaluation and learning (MEL), the focus of M&E/MEL
remains on single-loop learning and assessing how well adapta-
tion activities are being implemented, rather than double- or
triple-loop learning, which questions the appropriateness of those
activities in the first place and encompasses iterative, participa-
tory and action learning interactions (Argyris and Schön, 1978).
A focus on beneficiaries reached and the delivery and uptake of
intervention outputs means that M&E frameworks usually pay lit-
tle attention to longer-term outcomes or impacts as reflected in
the subsequent socio-political relations, resilience or well-being
of beneficiary populations, or indeed the impacts on non-
beneficiary populations.
This is due to a combination of factors. First, the fact that M&E is
overwhelmingly specific to individual interventions means that it
is carried out over timescales that are generally too short to inter-
rogate adaptation success in terms of longer-term outcomes and
impacts. Second, the normative and contested nature of what ‘suc-
cessful’ adaptation looks like (Dilling et al., 2019) means that there
is no agreement on what metrics to use to evaluate success. Some
have argued that ultimate purpose of adaptation is a normative
one: to sustain and enhance development performance and human
well-being in the face of climate change. In this view, adaptation
success ultimately should be measured – at the impact level –
using development and well-being metrics contextualised using
climate information (Barrett et al., 2020; Brooks et al., 2019). How-
ever, we follow others who have argued that indicators of success
in adaptation cannot be universal nor neutral, as success is histor-
ically contingent, normative and context specific (Moser and
Boykoff, 2014). Like vulnerability itself, what constitutes enhanced
development and well-being is bound up in the exercise of power
in contestations over authority, knowledges and identities. As such,
social and process-oriented indicators, which would be required to
dynamically monitor changes in vulnerability or resilience, are
complex, context-specific and therefore resource-intensive to
attempt to define and measure (Eriksen and Kelly, 2007; Brooks
and Fisher, 2014).7
Finally, M&E frameworks tend not to fully interrogate any neg-
ative or unwanted outcomes of adaptation interventions. Report-
ing templates for adaptation M&E typically focus on effective
management of the planned activities, rather than identifying
potential negative impacts on areas, socio-political relations and
groups outside the sphere of control of the intervention
(Atteridge & Remling, 2018). Even at a technical level, tools do
not always fit the climate context: for example, the Environmental
and Social Management Framework used by the World Bank and
Green Climate Fund aims to provide guidelines for screening pro-
jects to identify risk, but does not necessarily account for the
longer-term nature of climate risk. Maladaptation and the extent
to whichmeasures fit adaptation needs are key gaps in M&E frame-
works (Bours et al., 2013), along with the evaluation of how adap-
tation activities affect socio-political relations, resilience,
development performance and human well-being in the longer
term (Brooks et al., 2019).
3.2. Inequitable participation in planning and implementation of
interventions
A second key mechanism that weakens the way that vulnerabil-
ity is addressed is insufficient participation by a range of margina-
lised groups in the design, planning and implementation of
adaptation interventions. Inclusive and representative participa-
tion is important to ground interventions in a sound understanding
of how multiple causes of vulnerability affect groups differently
(Forsyth, 2018). Equally important, political marginalisation
shapes vulnerability (and vice versa); hence the process of planning
and implementing adaptation measures needs to give space to
socio-politically marginalised and often invisible groups and their
needs in deliberating adaptation alternatives, in order to avoid
exacerbating marginalisation (Tschakert et al., 2013; Taylor,
2015; Nightingale, 2017).
Despite good intentions and provisions for participation, project
planning and management is often top-down, risking the genera-
tion of measures that exacerbate inequalities. Community-level
participation in planning, although often required, is frequently
problematic (Omukuti, 2020b). At worst, adaptation interventions
are legitimised through seemingly ‘participatory processes’, while
local communities and marginalised people have limited say over
the process through which the adaptation responses are framed
and defined (Khatri, 2018; Mikulewicz, 2020b). When consulta-
tions do take place, the pressure to deliver quick results encour-
ages a reliance on existing governance institutions and following
established power relations, such that marginalized voices remain
unheard and existing inequalities are reinforced, including on the
basis of gender, literacy and caste (Nightingale, 2017; Mosberg
et al., 2017). Hence, many participatory climate change adaptation
policies and action plans exclude the most marginalised as a result
of their inherent power relations (Khatri, 2018; McNamara et al.,
2020; Omukuti, 2020b).
Experiences with learning in adaptation suggests that in order
for initiatives to foster real engagement, they must be designed
for openness to listen and learn from stakeholders as well as being
adaptive to distinct local contexts (Tschakert et al., 2016). Climate
interventions have often struggled to address the complexities and
power relations involved in ensuring participation and engage-
ment of marginalised groups, however. For example, NGO facilita-
tors of participatory processes are often aware of how power
relations inhibit active participation of the most marginalised,
but do not have the mandate to address these at the local or
broader levels, nor the tools to identify the causes of exclusion in
these interactions (Nagoda and Nightingale, 2017). Widely-used
participatory methodologies are similarly inadequate for overcom-
ing entrenched power relations at district level (Regmi et al., 2016).
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local actors are unable to ensure the meaningful inclusion of the
most marginalised.
3.3. Retrofitting adaptation into development assistance
As a consequence of insufficient capacity, learning and partici-
pation processes in adaptation funding – as well as interests vested
in ongoing development agendas – there is a tendency to ‘retrofit’
or ‘rebrand’ existing development projects as adaptation efforts.
The complementary aims of adaptation and development, and
the rapid increase in funding available for the former, encourages
retrofitting of adaptation activities to fit existing development
agendas. However, whilst related, adaptation and development
are not the same, with a major difference being that the former
addresses current and future climate risk and the socio-
environmental causes of vulnerability, which often demands a
rethink of how current development may in fact be producing vul-
nerability relations.
Finance intended for climate change adaptation often ends up
funding existing development activities that are simply rebranded
because they address climate-sensitive sectors or livelihoods
(Schipper et al., 2020a). As a result, they are not typically designed
with an emphasis on reducing vulnerability, or it is a secondary
goal overshadowed by a different environmental or development
goal. ‘Mainstreaming’, whereby adaptation needs are integrated
into an existing development portfolio, has been shown also to
have detrimental effects, as adaptation is often co-opted to support
existing development agendas rather than genuinely addressing
climate change risks (Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020). The two pro-
cesses hence dovetail as a form of retrofitting; existing develop-
ment activities are rebranded as adaptation and new adaptation
projects are co-opted to support existing development agendas.
Such retrofitting hinders addressing the root causes of vulnerabil-
ity, including changing those development paradigms, discourses,
interventions and related socio-political relations that produce
vulnerability.
Where existing development activities are simply rebranded as
adaptation, funding may serve to entrench unsustainable practices,
increasing vulnerability to climate change. The largest Public
Works Programme in the world, India’s Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), is one example of
development being rebranded as adaptation. Adam (2015) found
that the scheme provides an important ‘lifeline’ to livelihoods at
the margins, but misses opportunities to promote longer lasting,
transformative adaptation. For this to happen, the scheme’s proce-
dures and mechanisms would need to be tailored explicitly
towards adaptation, and not limited to the design of traditional
social security programmes. Such a reform has to be informed
through empirical research (e.g. contextual vulnerability assess-
ments), in addition to promoting awareness within departments,
and incorporating the climate-development interface at various
scales from local to national (Adam, 2015).
Retrofitting tends to lead to a focus on the ‘adaptation deficit’
(the gap between current practices and the practices that would
be well adapted to existing climate hazards (Burton, 2004)) or per-
ceived immediate development needs rather than on what is
needed to address anticipated future risks or the social and envi-
ronmental causes of vulnerability. This means the vulnerability
context and the gravity of future climate risks may be underesti-
mated, potentially undermining adaptation to future climate
change (Dilling et al., 2015; Ojwang et al., 2017). Eriksen et al.
(2015) note that adaptation interventions have often taken the
form of supporting activities that largely deal with current climate
variability such as disaster risk reduction, social safety nets, water
management, ecosystems management, agricultural practices,8
improved meteorological services and forecasting, micro-finance,
and index-based insurance. For example, a review of 56 activities
supported by the DFID StARCK+ programme in Kenya concluded
that some two thirds focused principally on familiar, existing risks,
and only a handful could be said to be explicitly and deliberately
targeting the (already observed) impacts of climate change
(Brooks, 2017).
Various institutional factors also act to impede the modification
of development intentions into effective adaptation. The preoccu-
pation of donors with avoiding ‘double dipping’ of development
projects in adaptation funds means that they typically apply the
logic of additionality, whereby the adaptation finance covers the
additional costs of ‘climate proofing’ a project (Stadelmann et al.,
2011). This approach is likely to favour incremental approaches
to adaptation that seek to protect and preserve existing systems
and practices, and inhibit the transformative adaptation that might
be required where current institutions and socio-political relations
are likely to be unviable in future and need to be radically modi-
fied, replaced with alternatives, or abandoned altogether (Brooks
et al., 2019). At the same time, the longer-term viability of projects
is impeded by artificially drawn boundaries between activities
within climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction and
achieving sustainable development goals. Although these fields
are closely linked, they are usually addressed by different local to
national level (government) departments and in particular through
different funding instruments, which means that the synergies
between activities are rarely maximized (Schipper et al., 2016). A
lack of communication and collaboration across organisations, pro-
jects and initiatives that are implementing adaptation activities in
similar regions may lead to duplication of adaptation efforts as
well as reducing the overall effectiveness of interventions and
undermining the potential for cross-sectoral and cross-
institutional learning.
3.4. ‘Adaptation success’ implicitly defined by dominant development
agendas
Pervading all these three mechanisms is the tendency of pro-
jects to insufficiently conceptualise and evaluate what constitutes
‘adaptation success’ and how the meaning of such success varies
and is contested between different groups. The insufficient engage-
ment with what ‘adaptation success’ looks like for a given inter-
vention is in part due to a lack of contextual understanding and
narrowly framed project-based monitoring and evaluation that is
more concerned with ensuring the project delivered what it
intended than with its broader impacts on vulnerability. But this
failure also reflects inequitable power relations and participation
processes in planning and implementation and how such skewed
processes come to make normative judgements of what constitutes
‘good’ adaptation . Employing a social justice interpretation of
adaptation, this paper highlights how adaptation actions are
always embedded within the exercise of power in socio-
environmental contexts. This interpretations suggestst that the
focus needs to be on reducing climate related risks and their social
production and unequal outcomes across groups, and shifting
socio-political relations that marginalise groups in decision-
making.
The space for real local participation in defining ‘adaptation suc-
cess’ is often limited by the politics of funding and prevailing
development discourses, as well as an exclusion of local knowl-
edges. A fundamental challenge for participation is the fact that
dominant views within funding and implementing organisations
regarding what constitutes ‘good development’ implicitly or
explicitly frame the objectives of adaptation measures. These
pre-existing views and the organisational mandates of develop-
ment actors can limit real participation in deciding on project
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promoted as an environmentally and socially sustainable agricul-
tural development strategy in Zambia. However, in practice, envi-
ronmental and participation concerns are side-lined, and a new
green revolution is promoted with a focus on private sector-led
agricultural development (Westengen et al., 2018). Particular
development agendas are also reflected in the priorities of funding
mechanisms. For example, although 130 civil society organisations
participated in the design and development of the Green Climate
Fund, their values of civic environmentalism, which focused on
human rights and pro-poor climate finance, were undermined by
an overall emphasis on financial and economic calculation
(Bruun, 2018). These examples reflect dominant preoccupations
with economic growth, efficiency and private sector commerciali-
sation. More fundamentally, the retrofitting of adaptation to serve
existing development agendas implicitly defines adaptation suc-
cess in relation to those agendas. The paradigm out of which adap-
tation is defined – performed through planning, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation – determines what is justified as ‘good
adaptation’ within decision-making, which actors and interests are
heard, and which groups or options are silenced (Mikulewicz,
2020b).
The examples of top-down interventions and coercive liveli-
hood transformations described in Section 2.3 draw attention to
the dangers of enrolling adaptation into dominant development
discourses framed by ideas about modernity and progress. For
example, views that pastoralists need to undergo sedentarisation
because they are ‘backward’ and therefore need to modernise, as
expressed in the context of the Gambella case study discussed
above (Milman and Arsano, 2014), can be located firmly within
models of progressive social evolution rooted in Enlightenment
philosophical traditions originating in Western Europe and North
America. These models, involving the universal, progressive ‘ad-
vancement’ of human societies through a series of fixed stages,
from hunting and gathering, through mobile pastoralism, to settled
societies and finally to cities and states (Sanderson, 1990), were
propagated through European colonialism (Olroyd, 1983; Cooper,
1997), and have been reproduced, modified and extended in the
fields of economics and development (Balakrishan et al., 2003).
Development models based on transitions from subsistence to
commercialisation, and transitions from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’,
market-based, services-driven, consumer societies, represent an
extension of these ideas (Cooper, 1997; Balakrishan et al., 2003).
While policies based on transitions to commercial farming can
benefit smallholders if they address climate risks, protect tenure
and genuinely enhance livelihoods (see, for example, some of the
interventions under the StARCK+ programme described by
Brooks (2017)), they may also result in the further marginalisation
of vulnerable groups, for example if they favour the expansion of
larger commercial growers at the expense of smallholders, as
observed in Section 2.1.
In being co-opted by existing development agendas, adaptation
risks entrenching ideologically driven development models whose
core assumptions might be fundamentally at odds with vulnerabil-
ity reduction and support for marginalised groups. A key function
of adaptation should be to interrogate whether existing develop-
ment agendas involving the commercialisation of agriculture, the
expansion of certain services, the sedentarisation of pastoralists,
and other land use, land rights and livelihood transformations
are likely to reduce or enhance vulnerability (Mikulewicz, 2020a;
Webber & Donner, 2017). More fundamentally, adaptation inter-
ventions need to critically examine the validity of the implicit
(and sometimes explicit) assumptions about relationships between
development, modernity and progress. For example, while mobile
pastoralism is often seen as inimical to modernity, it evolved and
was propagated in Africa as a pragmatic response to rapid and sev-9
ere climate change (Kuper & Kröpelin, 2006), and continues to pro-
vide an effective means of navigating climatic uncertainty and
variability (Krätli et al., 2013). With appropriate policies that facil-
itate mobility and allow pastoralists access to key resources, pas-
toralism has the potential to play a key role in adaptation, and
could replace sedentary agriculture in marginal areas where cli-
mate change makes the latter less viable in the future (Jones and
Thornton, 2009). In contrast, adaptation policies that result in the
involuntary sedentarisation of pastoralists, or the displacement
or loss of livelihoods of other marginalized groups, directly threa-
ten people’s tangible and intangible heritage and may exacerbate
vulnerability (Brooks, Clarke, Ngaruiya, & Wangui, 2020).4. Avenues for strengthening vulnerability reduction in
adaptation efforts
The previous sections have identified how many current adap-
tation interventions reinforce, redistribute or create new vulnera-
bility as a result of (i) failing to understand the complexity of the
vulnerability context; (ii) inequitable stakeholder participation in
the design and implementation; (iii) retrofitting adaptation into
development assistance; and (iv) insufficient conceptualisation
and evaluation of ‘adaptation success’. These shortcomings
together point to the multi-scalar nature of adaptation, combined
with how power and politics define adaptation practices, as signif-
icant factors in the failure of many adaptation interventions to
reduce vulnerability. Whether vulnerability is reinforced, redis-
tributed or created depends on the object and scale of analysis.
However, the issue of scale and knowledge is not just one of
whether location-specific project monitoring and evaluation cap-
tures negative effects elsewhere or at other spatial or time scales.
As we have shown in the previous section, the effects of adaptation
interventions are related to questions of adaptation for whom, who
is authorised to decide, whose problem framings and understand-
ings count, who decides whether adaptation is successful using
what criteria, and who is responsible for carrying out adaptation
activities in practice. Ideas of ‘adaptation success’ are normative,
contextual, and socially contingent; that is, they depend on whose
vulnerability and which risks are deemed acceptable or unaccept-
able and are therefore nested in the politics of definitional power
which are distinctly uneven between adaptation actors. These
actors – whether making adaptation decisions or being the target
of them – operate at different scales, as does their knowledge
(Ahlborg and Nightingale, 2018). Adaptation interventions are
imbued with the exercise of power in participation, definition,
scale and knowledge, often embodying a skewed politics that con-
tradicts the very goal of vulnerability reduction. For example, top-
down projects that authorize actors at international or national
levels (organisations or consultants) to govern adaptation or other
climate actions, while placing responsibility for carrying out such
actions at the local level (for example with small-scale farmers)
may both disempower and marginalise actors, exacerbating their
vulnerability (Arora-Jonsson et al., 2016; Schilling et al., 2017;
Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020). Here we review emerging literature
showing potential avenues for overcoming these challenges.4.1. Shifting the terms of engagement with ‘local’ socio-political
vulnerability contexts
Over the course of the last decade, scholars and practitioners
have reflected on how the terms of engagement for vulnerability
reduction and adaptation intervention design can be shifted. In
particular, they emphasise the importance of: rethinking the
notion of ‘participatory’ design (i.e. addressing what participation
really means); ensuring that all relevant actors’ knowledge and
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that all those engaged are respectful of ‘ownership’ to the process;
and, above all, of considering power relations – particularly in
regard to those who are at the receiving end of adaptation funding
(Ludi et al., 2014). Emerging literature explores tools such as delib-
erative dialogues and M&E (Ojha et al., 2020), underscoring that
until the diversity of worldviews and aspirations, including those
of science and local knowledge interactions (Jasanoff, 2003) are
taken into consideration, progress on adaptation will be limited.
An expanding literature shows the importance of recognising a
diversity in ways of understanding the world – ontological plural-
ism – for shifting the terms of engagement with local vulnerability
contexts (Klenk et al., 2017; Goldman et al., 2018; Nightingale
et al., 2020). This reflects the diverse interests, values, visions,
desired futures, and knowledges that shape who decides, and
whose values count, in making adaptation decisions, and how
these lead to differential effects of interventions. A key challenge
for efforts to shift socio-political relations is the tendency, as
described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, for interventions to be increas-
ingly framed by the way that global actors, including consultants,
’experts’ and development organisations, understand the prob-
lems, needs and solutions as part of adaptation, while the adapta-
tion knowledge and needs of the most marginalised is rendered
invisible (Mikulewicz, 2020b). This biased valuing of knowledge,
and the privileging of certain cultural frameworks and norms as
if they are axiomatic, is a problem for developing effective mea-
sures, but more importantly, the process itself reinforces the social
and political exclusion that drive vulnerability to climate change in
the first place.
Several authors highlight the transformative potential of knowl-
edge and learning processes as part of the adaptation process
(Tschakert et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2016; Tran et al., 2020).
Ontological pluralism and justice in adaptation entails processes
of negotiation and contestation of development goals, knowledges
and norms between diverse actors and interests (Klenk et al., 2017;
Ziervogel et al., 2017). Engaging directly with contested and
diverse knowledges, and tackling the power dynamics inherent
in knowledge processes such as co-production, are identified as
key to building resilience. An expanding literature argues that it
is only through deliberating adaptation alternatives and opening
up space for the contestation of predominant development choices
and inequitable knowledge and authority relations that the socio-
political relations driving vulnerability can be transformed (Taylor,
2015; Eriksen et al., 2015; Nightingale, 2017; Kaika, 2017). Taking
an explicitly deliberative approach to adaptation means involving
a broader set of people than ‘experts’, ‘policy-makers’ and ‘local
leaders’ in decision making, strengthening the role of marginalised
people in defining problems and solutions (Mees et al., 2014;
Goldman et al., 2018; Ojha et al., 2020). More fundamentally, delib-
eration involves going beyond stakeholder engagement to explic-
itly explore differential understandings, knowledges, values, and
political interests between groups related to what the causes of
vulnerability are and what constitutes ‘good development’, ‘adap-
tation’ or ‘transformation’ (Forsyth, 2019; Klenk et al., 2017). In
particular, challenging rather than perpetuating development
agendas and paradigms that marginalise populations is critical
for effective adaptation to take place (Mikulewicz and Taylor,
2020). Some promising examples exist: Ziervogel et al. (2016)
demonstrates how shifting from ‘strengthening the science–policy
interface to the knowledge–policy interface’ helped integrate
diverse knowledge forms and development interests within
municipal adaptation planning in South Africa (p. 455). Studying
the case of Little Andaman, Blackburn (2018) found that
community-based, rights-oriented education and advocacy pro-
grammes were potentially transformative for the ways local people
interact with the state because of their role in opening up space for10communities to critically reflect on state responsibilities, capaci-
ties, and weaknesses.
Importantly, ‘marginalised people’ are not a homogeneous
group: people’s interests, sources of vulnerability, and adaptation
knowledges differ (Lade et al., 2017). Hence shifting the terms of
engagement through ontological pluralism and learning spaces
entails engaging actively with this heterogeneity and the related
socio-political dynamics. Paying attention to the social context
means taking seriously the values, priorities, and worldviews of
marginalised groups. However, equally importantly, attention to
the social and political context means realising that the values, pri-
orities and worldviews will vary – and are continuously negotiated
– between (sub)groups of stakeholders affected by a given inter-
vention (Arifeen and Eriksen, 2020). This heterogeneity as well as
socio-political dynamics highlight why the common practice of
identifying ‘vulnerable groups’ and assuming that ‘communities’
are homogeneous entities when targeting adaptation investments
is deeply problematic (Titz et al., 2018). Specifically, intersectional-
ity – the way in which multiple subjectivities that divide social
groups interact to reinforce each other (including gender, race,
class and (dis)ability) – needs to be acknowledged and studied
(Nightingale, 2017). Thus, exploring gender or caste issues inde-
pendently of understanding how they come to reinforce each
other, can give a false understanding of the causes of vulnerability
(Carr & Owusu-Daaku, 2016; Ray-Bennett, 2009).
A specific entry point for operationalising the shifting of terms
of engagement with the vulnerability context is to ensure that all
stages of planning and implementation of interventions consis-
tently approach communities as heterogeneous in terms of values,
worldviews, priorities, power relations and livelihoods. This
involves, for example, M&E frameworks that use indicators that
are differentiated between groups, reflecting differences between
them in priorities, risks and impacts (rather than a uniform set of
indicators for all groups). Similarly, the social heterogeneity of
communities is critical in learning and deliberation processes, such
as how the power relations, institutional structures and cultural
norms that perpetuate gender, class, caste and ethnic discrimina-
tion in turn shape who has access to decision-making fora, whose
interests and values are represented, and whose voices are heard
and taken seriously (Figueiredo & Perkins, 2012; Tschakert et al.,
2016).4.2. Broadening the focus from ‘local’ vulnerability to the global
context and multi-scalar processes producing vulnerability
Many of the shortcomings in efforts to reduce vulnerability
identified in this review relate to the fact that adaptation initiatives
address the observed symptoms of vulnerability, rather than the
cause (Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020). Moreover, they typically take
a spatially-restricted approach which further increases the risk
that reduction of vulnerability within that location may end up
redistributing it or reinforcing it elsewhere. Broadening the focus
from local vulnerability to the global context and multi-scalar pro-
cesses that drive and reinforce vulnerability opens up opportuni-
ties for identifying and addressing the root causes.
Taking a broader approach that considers how cultural and
socio-political contexts are entangled in processes across scales is
one way of making visible potential impacts that reinforce or redis-
tribute vulnerability beyond a project’s boundaries (Symons,
2014). In the context of agriculture, for example, Vermeulen
et al. (2018) have highlighted that there can be many opportunities
for transformation of practices, but these require an expansion of
the focus of adaptation planning in order to take the multi-
functionality of agriculture into account, as well as a system-
wide view of food production and consumption.
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the terms of engagement with ‘local’ socio-political vulnerability
contexts and broaden the focus from ‘local’ vulnerability to the glo-
bal context and multi-scalar processes producing vulnerability can
take place? Adaptation has been highlighted as an opportunity to
rethink how we ‘do development’ in order to support more equita-
ble and sustainable ‘climate resilient development pathways’ and
confront, rather than sidestep, difficult development issues
(Denton et al., 2014; Schipper et al., 2020b). However, to date,
adaptation has not altered the way that societies plan for the
future, but instead (at best) integrated a set of climate-related risks
into traditional planning approaches, often retrofitting existing
development interventions, as observed in Section 3. This suggests
that changes ‘at home’ and within existing development paradigms
may be required to engender transformation of the unjust develop-
ment pathways that produce climate change as well as inequality
and vulnerability (Lade et al., 2017). A critical implication of these
observations is that adaptation does not necessarily entail the need
for more expert knowledge to direct how marginalised groups
should transform their practices or knowledge; instead, it entails
shifting the knowledge and learning processes that take place
within implementing organisations, funding structures, and
research. Simply put: it is the adaptation organisations and experts
– rather than the marginalised people and their livelihoods – that
need to transform.
Recent literature suggests that an entry point for shifting how
organisations ‘do adaptation’ is to generate processes for learning
and reflection within aid organisations themselves, addressing fun-
damental barriers to learning such as lack of feedback and account-
ability. Rarely do we connect the critique of adaptation to asking
how learning takes place within organisations responsible for plan-
ning and implementing adaptation. Such learning spaces are
instrumental for enabling transformative measures (Tschakert
et al., 2016; Matin et al., 2018; Ojha et al., 2020). Fundamentally,
learning requires processes for obtaining feedback on the results
of actions taken, such as adaptation outcomes, as well as institu-
tional structures for ensuring accountability for those actions.
Development aid is particularly fraught with mechanisms and
uneven relations that impede feedback and accountability, and
thus learning (Eyben, 2005). Learning spaces are important
because, in the absence of a profound understanding of vulnerabil-
ity, resilience-building efforts run the risk of perpetuating prob-
lematic assumptions and marginalising the least entitled in
terms of assets and social relations (MacKinnon and Derickson,
2013).
Adaptation interventions are often focussed on achieving speci-
fic targets and impacts in the short term (Mikulewicz, 2020a,
2020b). Far less time is spent reflecting on how projects are framed
and how expectations around outcomes are developed and howwe
can Monitor, Evaluate and Learn (MEL) from approaches and pro-
jects. Creating mechanisms and spaces for reflection and question-
ing within implementing organisations regarding their own
assumptions around questions such as who is vulnerable and
why, what constitutes ‘good development’, what adaptation inter-
ventions are needed, and who can best make decisions about and
implement them, is a key vehicle for tuning in to the complexity
of climate adaptation and vulnerability reduction. An important
implication of the need for ontological pluralism and engaging
with marginalised groups as socially heterogeneous is the need
for adaptation processes to hold tensions and conflicting interests
– and to be transparent and just in decision-making. Are current
planning, implementation and MEL instruments designed to do
this?
However, learning and reflection need to go even further, and
question many of the fundamental and often unacknowledged
assumptions that underpin development. Pelling (2011) asks11whether development institutions, which are embedded in exist-
ing power relations and development logics, can address develop-
ment problems (including climate change) they have played a role
in creating. How can we address the fact that adaptation is embed-
ded in and largely supportive of existing power relations that have
caused the very problems adaptation ostensibly seeks to address?
Can the adaptation machinery step outside of, and challenge, these
relations? The above discussion suggests some possible entry
points for deeper reflection. For example, in academic circles, there
is a growing focus on transformative adaptation as the radical
restructuring, replacement or abandonment of systems and prac-
tices whose viability climate change throws into question. This
thinking is yet to penetrate into development practice, and raises
a number of very difficult questions for development practitioners.
Nonetheless, it provides an entry point for challenging the wide-
spread assumption in practice that adaptation is about protecting
and preserving existing systems and enabling the continuation of
existing practices (IPCC, 2018; Brooks et al., 2019), and thus repre-
sents one avenue for addressing the retrofitting of adaptation to
existing development priorities. O’Brien (2018) argues that ques-
tioning predominant assumptions, beliefs and worldviews is a
key leverage point for transforming power relations and practices.
Adaptation practitioners might interrogate how dogmas of growth
and progress frame and drive actions that increase vulnerability,
and challenge the validity of such frameworks and their universal
application through a critical examination of their origins and
impacts on marginalised people (Brooks, Clarke, Ngaruiya, &
Wangui, 2020).5. Conclusion: A post-adaptation turn?
The proliferation of adaptation projects around the world – and
the focus on marginalised groups that they represent – should be a
cause for celebration. Yet our review of climate change adaptation
interventions reveals that, contrary to common rhetoric, adapta-
tion does not necessarily reduce vulnerability. Indeed, there are
multiple ways in which adaptation efforts may instead increase,
redistribute or create new sources of vulnerability. We have cate-
gorised the underlying mechanisms through which adaptation
efforts end up exacerbating vulnerability as relating to: the shallow
understanding of the vulnerability context; the inequitable nature
of stakeholder participation in the design and implementation of
adaptation; the retrofitting of adaptation into existing develop-
ment agendas; and lack of critical engagement with how ‘adapta-
tion success’ is defined. A retrofitting hinders addressing the
socio-political causes of vulnerability; in addition, elite capture
and an ’accumulation by adaptation’ can widen inequalities. Our
review concludes that addressing these mechanisms demands a
rethink of how adaptation and development are done. In particular,
instead of designing projects to change the practices of margina-
lised populations, placing learning processes within organisations
and with marginalised populations at the centre of adaptation
objectives is key to shifting the terms of engagement and broaden-
ing the focus for successful and inclusive adaptation.
Our findings resonate with Thomas and Warner’s (2019) frame-
work of how people are made more vulnerable through climate
change adaptation, and reinforces the growing volume of work
on maladaptation (Antwi-Agyei, Dougill, Stringer, & Codjoe,
2018; Juhola, Glaas, Linnér, & Neset, 2016; Magnan et al., 2016;
Work, Rong, Song, & Scheidel, 2019). However, our findings go
beyond a maladaptation focus on unintended negative conse-
quences of adaptation measures, to suggest that adaptation inter-
ventions risk becoming tools for marginalisation and instruments
of abuse.
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same patterns behind the principal failings of development assis-
tance since the end of the colonial era (Ferguson, 1990; Escobar,
1995; Ireland and McKinnon, 2013). This so-called post-
development critique is centred on the notion that a Western model
of development, especially development as ‘progress’ emerges as a
form of domination that repeats many of the patterns of colonial-
ism (Sultana, 2019). Yet, post-development as a movement has
been unable to reverse the unequal structures and institutions that
make up development assistance. Calls have been made for the
next generation of adaptation measures to move from incremental
and technical adaptation to transformation, where adaptation is
seen as a social change process which also entails transforming
systems and structures. Such adaptation requires paying close
attention to the paradigms we are in and addressing the underly-
ing causes of vulnerability and climate change (Pelling, 2011;
Denton et al., 2014; O’Brien, 2018). Our review echoes previous
findings that there are latent risks associated with decision-
makers translating the concept of transformation into policies
and practices if such processes are viewed as ‘‘apolitical, inevitable,
or universally beneficial” (Blythe et al., 2018, p. 13). If stuck within
the same development paradigm that is in part generating vulner-
ability, interventions aimed at transformation risk having even
more adverse effects on marginalised populations than current
adaptation, such as through coercive transformation of people’s
livelihoods. Within such a conception of ‘transformation’, the mar-
ginalised become responsible for adapting to a climate change
problem created by others, adding insult to injury. Awareness of
these latent risks are therefore necessary along with recognition
of the political, social, cultural, and spiritual dimensions of trans-
formative adaptation (Blythe et al., 2018). Adaptation is increas-
ingly being scrutinized through a post-development lens,
emphasising that the mechanisms leading to the current failure
of adaptation interventions to reduce vulnerability need to be
addressed (Ireland and McKinnon, 2013; Mikulewicz and Taylor,
2020). Within current adaptation cum development paradigms,
inequitable terms of engagement with ‘vulnerable’ populations
are reproduced and the multi-scalar processes driving vulnerabil-
ity remain largely ignored. As a consequence, we pose the question
of whether scholarship and practice need to take a post-adaptation
turn akin to post-development, by seeking a pluralism of ideas
about adaptation while critically interrogating how these ideas
form part of the politics of adaptation and the processes (re)pro-
ducing vulnerability. Post-adaptation is an appropriate term
because it mirrors the situation whereby development was shown
to be perpetuating colonialism – in this case post-adaptation refers
to the reproduction of power relations and poverty caused by
development projects, and reflects that we now have sufficient
experience on the ground with adaptation to warrant a fresh start
with a different and more informed approach. First introduced by
Webber (2016), post-adaptation is a concept that has potential to
point to the risks of overly technocratic and Western-driven mod-
els of adaptation.
Such a post-adaptation turn has several implications for how
formal adaptation interventions are planned, implemented and
funded. First, vulnerability reduction cannot take place through
formal projects alone. A premise of this review, as mentioned at
the outset, is that planned adaptation interventions are only one
of many types of action – from daily livelihood actions, to corpo-
rate business decisions, civil society actions, and international
trade policy reform – that form part of the adaptation process. A
key issue, which the current COVID-19 pandemic has further high-
lighted, is how our collective futures are governed by a wide set of
shifts and disruptions, policies and decision-making processes,
beyond those concerning climate change. Hence adaptation
includes but is not contained within the realm – and the responsi-12bility – of government and aid organisations. However, adaptation
projects, despite their worrying track record to date, at the very
least provide some important lessons regarding how vulnerability
reduction can (or cannot) take place. The evidence suggests that
they may play a useful role in the adaptation process as arenas
for rethinking what good adaptation is, for whom, and how it
can be done differently to transform inequitable socio-political
relations and address marginalisation processes. If experimenta-
tion, collaboration, and deeper learning among adaptation actors
become a central goal of adaptation projects rather than delivering
measurable material outputs according to ‘development as usual’
standards, more equitable and lasting vulnerability reduction
may be possible.
Second, ontological pluralism and opening up the ownership of
adaptation knowledge to effectively include marginalised groups,
deliberation of conflicting interests and assumptions behind what
is legitimised as ‘good adaptation’ within currently dominant ide-
ological frameworks, as well as a close integration of learning,
research and practice within adaptation projects are key to achiev-
ing more inclusive and innovative adaptation interventions. This
observation, however, directs attention to the limits to radical
rethinking and redesigning that are possible within the current
adaptation-development apparatus. A key question is how funding
structures, power relations, and the organisation and implementa-
tion of adaptation interventions may open up or close down space
for reflective learning processes within organisations as well as
deliberative processes within projects.
Much of the research reviewed in this paper points out that
supporting adaptation in developing countries is anything but a
quick and easy fix. This observation does not mean that adaptation
policy and interventions should not be carried out – they are crit-
ical to address the global inequality inherent in climate change
pointed out at the outset of this paper. Climate and adaptation
funding have led to much-needed investment in a number of crit-
ical sectors in developing countries, such as agriculture, infrastruc-
ture and health. There has, however, been little holistic or
connected understanding and learning about how such investment
may reduce, enhance, or redistribute vulnerability across scales. It
is our hope that the post-adaptation turn we call for can generate
renewed critical engagement – based on robust empirical insights
– with the multi-scalar politics of vulnerability and adaptation
interventions.
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